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Main messages from the T7 meeting 
The G7 has made the fight against inequality a crosscutting issue for the Biarritz Summit. The 
Development Ministerial will address issues of vulnerability, especially the Sahel Alliance. This focus 
on inequalities and vulnerabilities is nonetheless inseparable from a general discussion on financing 
for sustainable development. 
The international development agenda relies today on a very legitimate political basis, agreed on in 
2015: Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals, and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on 
financing sustainable development. But even though this basis is politically sound, we are facing two 
major issues, requiring urgent action: 
1. We are not on track for reaching SDGs in 2030, even on goals that seemed to be reachable before 
2015 like poverty reduction, food and nutrition security, or on essential issues like access to sanitation: 
a step change and acceleration in implementation is thus critically necessary. The SDG approach is also 
a call for a renewed approach, moving to a new form of partnership in a pluralist world. 
2. The landscape of the major players appears very fragmented. While the UK was a champion of 
Millennium Development Goals implementation between 2000 and 2015, no country or region today 
has taken a position of leadership1. Leadership appears necessary, because of the multiplicity of 
players who have to play an important role in financing development (private and public, in particular). 
The world is going through an unprecedented transition, and developing countries are at a crossroads. 
Investing in an inclusive, resilient, sustainable economic transformation pathway is a necessity, for the 
sustainability of their own development but also as a contribution to global public goods. 
China has presented how it sees development and international cooperation through its Belt and Road 
Initiative and places this initiative under the overall objectives adopted by all countries in 2015: the 
Paris Agreement, the 2030 Agenda, and its sustainable development goals (SDGs). The Belt and Road 
Initiative’s Chinese proposal is a pragmatic interpretation of these agendas, and could be essentially 
considered as an investment program in infrastructures, aiming at intensified trade exchanges, and is 
presented as exempted from political conditionalities.  
Faced with this proposal from China, there is a lack of a clear ambition of G7 Members. Even if we 
know that public official development assistance will not be enough by itself, the G7 members are the 
biggest contributors to ODA and the largest shareholders of multilateral and bilateral development 
banks. The replenishment of many of the corresponding funds in the coming months is a very 
important window of opportunity for G7 country to show their leadership and their shared ambition. 
                                                           
1 The Chinese concept of a Belt and Road initiative can to some extent be considered as a 
contribution to the development agenda, and is explicitly put under the umbrella of implementing 
Agenda 2030, but it has not reached the status of an organising concept for other donor countries, nor 
for African countries who are expecting clearer leadership from G7 countries, at least as a 
counterproposal to the BRI or to avoid an overreliance on Chinese financial players. 
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There is thus a need for G7 Members to put more emphasis on their common ambition : support the 
implementation of Agenda 2030 by the countries themselves through their own definition of their 
economic transformation pathway, which takes into account all the dimensions of sustainability as 
well as of their vulnerabilities (economic, climatic and environmental, social). This shared ambition 
also entails putting the issues of governance and the promotion of democracy at the heart as a 
critical building block for reducing vulnerabilities. 
This last dimension is a distinctive feature of the G7 vision but it is not just an affirmation of values or 
a conditionality, it is instrumental in reaching sustainable development: building a robust and 
sustainable development pathway requires building on democratic institutions. In post-conflict 
situations and fragile states, the promotion of democracy and the liveliness of civil society are essential 
to build the foundations of socio-economic development.  
In this general perspective, the G7 has a strategic role to play by focusing on vulnerability issues and 
specifically on Africa. This is true for, at least, three reasons: First, vulnerability and its structural root 
causes can be the major obstacles in the next decade, preventing countries from reaching the 
Sustainable Development Goals. Second, in least developed country contexts, to have to tackle not 
only the reduction of poverty but also the reduction of inequalities as well environmental degradation, 
adaptation to and mitigation of climate change (as recommended by Agenda 2030) is a particularly 
challenging endeavor.  This is why the ambition of the G7 countries to implement the 2030 Agenda in 
vulnerable countries needs to be clarified: the two concepts of inequality and vulnerability make it 
possible to move forward on this point, with the more specific recommendations that we propose 
hereunder.  Third, African countries have coordinated and built initiatives at regional and subregional 
scale, leading to even higher expectations for a clarified partnership with the G7 countries (who should 
therefore be clearer in their proposal). .  
I. General recommendations:  
A central recommendation: reaffirming a G7 ambition for international cooperation for sustainable 
development, and in particular in support of African initiatives 
Against this backdrop, and given the importance of G7 countries and their institutions in the 
development agenda, the G7 has an essential role to play by regaining a capacity of leadership on the 
development agenda and reaffirming its ambition for reaching SDGs, particularly in its relation to the 
African continent. The G7 should confirm2 that its partnership with Africa is centred on supporting 
the long-term transformation of African societies towards sustainable development, along the 
transformation pathways that these societies define themselves. This implies particularly supporting 
existing initiatives, in the framework of the African Union like the Continental Free Trade 
Agreement, and other regional or subregional initiatives. 
This should be a guiding principle not only for development interventions of G7 members, but also for 
the vision of trade relations of other blocks and regions with the continent and more generally for the 
reform of the global governance of trade. As such, it is a major recommendation for the G7 heads of 
state meeting. 
G7 leadership will be particularly important in many instances where the future of the development 
agenda is being and will be discussed in the coming months (replenishment of multilateral 
                                                           
2 G8 already had committed to an Africa action plan in 2002, already mentioning key notions of 
ownership and partnership, but in a context of lower international fragmentation. 
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development banks and other funds like the Green Climate Fund, High level political forum on Agenda 
2030, SGNU Summit on SDGs and high level political dialogue on financing sustainable development). 
II. Specific recommendations : 
It is only within this general perspective that a focus on inequalities and vulnerabilities, consistent with 
the G7 presidency focus on inequalities, can be useful for alignment and coordination of G7 
development policies and strategies. The focus of the G7 development ministerial on the Sahel Alliance 
and on Education, gender and health, risks being too narrow if it is not positioned within this broader 
perspective. 
G7 leadership means alignment to the G7 partner’s objectives and convergence of G7 policies and 
strategies, on top of coordination at project level, which does not exclude pluralism and diversity in 
the means of implementation. The issue of inequalities and vulnerabilities offers an important 
potential to identify common ground. 
It is in this perspective that the following recommendations are formulated: 
1. Inequalities between countries: allocation to vulnerable countries 
Addressing structural vulnerabilities has the potential to equalise opportunities across countries and 
prevent vulnerable states from falling back into poverty trap and conflict. Available indicators 
measuring countries vulnerabilities offer considerable leeway to improve the allocation of aid to 
developing countries. G7 could commit to increase the amount of official development aid (ODA) 
allocated according to the various structural vulnerabilities of countries (economic, climatic, social). 
This recommendation is particularly important ahead of critical meetings of replenishment of 
multilateral development funds. In particular with regard to the concessional windows of the 
multilateral development banks G7 countries should coordinate to ensure that the concessional 
resources they provide jointly are made available to countries based on the structural vulnerability 
of recipient countries at the same time as their degree of poverty, without sacrificing the objective 
of performance.   
2. Within countries inequalities: convergence of visions and coordination of strategies 
Reducing inequalities has the political legitimacy of being one of the SDGs (SDG 10), but the ways and 
means to implement the fight against inequalities are a political choice to be made by countries. G7 
members should focus their intervention on supporting the countries’ strategies to tackle the root 
causes of vulnerabilities, building on evidence based research, with a clear commitment to the 
reduction of structural factors of inequality among social groups, and in particular gender inequality 
(SDG 5). 
Important principles, some of them already endorsed by the G7, constitute a common ground that 
has to be reaffirmed, as a signal of the leadership of G7 countries on these issues, and as a way to 
align strategic objectives of donors : 
- Support institutional capability and policy building           
- Promote interventions on governance, as they are critical to reduce vulnerabilities and inequalities, 
including the promotion of democracy and the support of civil society and its political space,  
- Support regional or national long term economic transformation strategies to reach sustainable 
development goals, focussing on employment opportunities for a rapidly growing population, and 
taking into account the impact of digitalization 
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- Support the establishment of a basis for fiscal systems, not to substitute domestic resources 
mobilisation to other sources of funding for development in countries where the latter are necessary, 
but as a no regret investment for financing basic services, infrastructure, environment protection, as 
well as potential future social transfer systems 
- Commit to ensure the consistency of G7 policies and strategies with the former recommendation 
through fighting illicit financial flows and tax havens 
- Ensure transparency in the financial flows (including private financial flows) 
- Support the phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, not only for their environmental impact, but also 
because they are a regressive policy 
- Monitor subnational level inequalities within countries and support strategies tackling them 
- Support the prevention of crises by analysing and addressing the nexus between climate change, 
natural resources degradation, vulnerabilities and conflict 
In situations where vulnerabilities are structural obstacles to development, G7 countries should step 
up efforts to coordinate their interventions through common objectives and beyond projects 
coordination, not excluding pluralism and differentiation. The Sahel Alliance can be used as a case 
from which interesting lessons can be drawn in this regard. 
Climate finance is critical to decrease climate change vulnerability and reach the objectives of the Paris 
Agreement. G7 countries development institutions play a key role on pushing the climate finance 
agenda forward. G7 countries should commit to enable a more unified landscape of climate finance. 
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Background Note : Inequalities and vulnerabilities : what is at stake ? 
This paper aims to provide recommendations to donors, particularly the G7 countries, so that they will 
be able to more effectively coordinate and improve the way that they tackle inequality and 
vulnerability in their development and cooperation policies. It builds on available research and policy 
documents, as well as first-hand assessment of donors’ revealed preferences. It proceeds in three 
steps. The first section wraps up the latest findings regarding the inequality–vulnerability nexus. It 
makes clear that, for most donors, inequality and vulnerability refer to between-country and not 
within-country inequality, although a growing body of evidence suggests that the latter needs to be 
tackled for the widely shared objectives of environmental sustainability and human development in a 
broad sense. Section 2 compares G7 members’ doctrines and discourses on the fight against 
vulnerabilities and inequalities. One of the main findings is that that few donors highlight the need to 
combat inequalities as the main goal of their cooperation and development strategy even though it is 
a growing (and relatively new) concern for the G7 member states. In addition, Section 2 analyses how 
the fight against fragility encompasses different objectives not only among countries,  but also within 
governments. Despite significant efforts in recent years to address these differences, through 
initiatives such as the Sahel Alliance or increased coordination between different ministries (Defence, 
Foreign Affairs and Development), there is still progress to be made. What’s more, each donor seems 
to place more or less emphasis on specific themes that reduce vulnerability, spanning strengthening 
governance, social needs, inclusive growth and climate change adaptation. This is nuanced in Section 
3 by the stylised data derived from an aid selectivity model that ranks countries according to the 
importance they attach to these variables through their aid allocation. Our model actually shows 
heterogeneity across G7 countries when it comes to addressing vulnerabilities and inequalities.  
 
1. The inequalities–vulnerabilities nexus 
 
Finding 1: Inequality of opportunity and vulnerability are closely intertwined at country level 
After decades of damage of the principle of economic convergence among countries, the early 21st 
century finally seemed to reconcile economic theory and textbooks with the facts. In the 2000s, GDP 
per capita grew steadily faster in poor countries than in more advanced economies. Even sub-Saharan 
African countries seemed to be swept up in this catch-up process, partly thanks to record price hikes 
on most commodity markets. Yet the 2010s showed that this convergence process was still fragile, 
particularly for countries with a limited capacity to cope with world market downturns and 
environmental shocks. In some cases, the unequal exposure to such shocks was compounded by the 
unequal capacity to mitigate their consequences, catching countries in a vulnerability trap3.  
Inequality of exposure and inequality of response capacity to external, climatic and political shocks 
have gradually been taken on board by donors in terms of their funding allocation, in close connection 
with empirical research and think-tank recommendations (Boussichas and Guillaumont, 2015). Such 
Inequalities are linked to vulnerability patterns, if this we take the broader definition of inequality as 
being the inequality of opportunity (or “inequality of fate”) among nations. To put it another way, 
inequality among countries and vulnerability reduction policies are consubstantial. Even though their 
effectiveness in addressing the root causes or “structural handicaps” of vulnerable countries remains 
                                                           
3 It should be recalled that vulnerability is defined as the risk of being negatively affected by exogenous shocks. These shocks can be economic, 
environmental or socio-political in nature. The concept of fragility generally refers to fragility of States, so to this last dimension of 
vulnerability, even if there are many different definitions of fragility in the literature. 
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disputed, development and cooperation policies targeting vulnerable countries are consistent with the 
historical commitments of donor countries to lift countries out of poverty. From a donor perspective, 
the issue hangs on improving aid allocation and its overall effectiveness in situations of structural 
vulnerability (Guillaumont et al., 2017).  
Finding 2: Reducing within-country inequality remains a second-class issue in the donor community 
The situation is notably different when it comes to within-country inequality reduction. The World 
Wealth and Income Database (WID.world) shows that, while evidence of economic convergence has 
been seen at the global level since the 1990s, and particularly since the 2000s, within-country 
inequality is on the rise, with the exception of Latin American countries and to a lesser extent in sub-
Saharan Africa. Research pioneered by Bourguignon, Morrisson, Ravaillon, Piketty, Cingano, Wilkinson 
and Pickett, among others, has documented the multiple trade-offs between income inequality and 
health, income inequality and GDP growth, inequality and resilience to environmental changes. The 
income inequality–vulnerability nexus, though still subject to scrutiny and a new field of research, 
seems  to translate economic inequality into inequality of the capacity to cope with economic and 
environmental shocks. It thus magnifies the impact of these shocks and increases vulnerability. The 
more unequal a society, the less resilient it is to external shocks.  
However, the “among” often overshadows the “within”, as sections 2 and 3 emphasise. The need to 
reduce within-country inequality for the sake of “sustainable development” has so far resulted in an 
uneven and circumspect buy-in from donors. Within-country income inequalities had been politically 
kept in the shadow of absolute poverty, until the Sustainable Development Goals replaced the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs, see Kabeer, 2010; Langford, 2010; de Albuquerque, 2012).   
The unanimous endorsement of the Sustainable Development Goals target for income inequalities 
(target 10.1) by the United Nations Member States marks an important shift. Target 10.1 explicitly 
includes within-country inequality reduction in the global development agenda and states: “By 2030, 
progressively achieve and sustain a reduction in income inequality, as measured by the share of the 
bottom 40 per cent of the population in national income, alongside economic growth”.   
This target of reducing within countries inequalities can be read in two ways. As a means to improve 
the resilience of vulnerable countries in the face of adverse economic, environmental and socio-
political shocks, including internal conflicts fuelled by structural inequality among social groups. And 
as an end, in order to reach out to the poorest people in nations across the world, beyond the “bottom 
billion4” (Collier, 2007), in the spirit of the Millennium Development Goals. 
Finding 3: Donors can reconcile within-country inequality and vulnerability reduction 
This 10.1 target was the subject of harshly contested debate in the Open Working Group tasked with 
establishing a list of goals and targets for intergovernmental negotiations. Many countries showed 
some reluctance towards this issue, which may also explain why donors deal with within-country 
inequality reduction in an uneven manner. Part of the reason for donors’ circumspection when it 
comes to reducing income inequality lies in the unresolved controversies surrounding the drivers of 
inequality. Part also lies in the lack of a possible common definition of what an acceptable level of 
income inequality would, could and should be.  
A vast literature posits and tests the theoretical drivers of inequality, as well as subsequent policy areas 
to address them (for an overview of this literature, see for example, Atkinson, 2015). After a decade 
                                                           
4 “Bottom Billion” refers to the populations of a group of countries at the bottom of the world economy. 
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of landmark research, the coverage and quality of available data on global inequality have expanded 
significantly (Milanovic, 2013; WID, 2016). Though much remains to be learnt, a substantial body of 
knowledge is available on the core drivers of inequality and can guide policy responses. We endorse 
the view of Atkinson (2015) and others that, in view of the knowledge that we now possess about 
inequality drivers, the response to rising inequality should be framed around policies and institutions. 
Chief among these are policies and institutions that propel an endogenous and sustainable tax-based 
development, in a virtuous circle of reducing inequality and political vulnerability. It is well-evidenced 
that, despite recent efforts to increase the amount of ODA directed to improving tax collection capacity 
and fiscal accountability in developing countries, the percentage remains far too low – under 1%. The 
idea is not to push vulnerable countries’ tax-to-GDP ratio up to the 40%–50% range of Denmark, 
Sweden or France. On the other hand, there is a middle ground target somewhere between the ratio 
commonly observed in the former countries and the 6% tax-to-GDP ratio of a country such as Nigeria, 
from which too many countries fall far short.  
If mobilising tax revenues is critical to addressing the challenges of within-country inequalities and 
vulnerabilities, the quality of expenditure is also crucial. A strategic “inequality and vulnerability 
reduction-driven” allocation of the collected revenues across sectors could complement a sustainable 
tax-based development. On this count, human capital (health and education) often comes first in policy 
prescription, but the associated policies could be supplemented by policies mitigating environmental 
vulnerability which mostly affects the poorest, in order to support the shift onto resilient, sustainable 
development pathways.  
 
 
2. Comparing the doctrines and discourses of G7 members as regards the fight against 
vulnerabilities 
The first section has analysed the inequality–vulnerability nexus according to the literature: it 
differentiates the links between vulnerability and inter-country inequalities, and also within-country 
inequalities. Do G7 members make this connection in their development policies, and if so, how? The 
aim of this section is to come up with answers to this question by exploring and comparing the stances, 
doctrines and ambitions of G7 when it comes to combatting inequalities and vulnerabilities in 
developing countries. We adopt a discourse analysis approach, drawing on official texts, statements, 
framework documents and notes endorsed by official bodies in G7 countries that are active in fragile 
or vulnerable states.  
Finding 4: Few donors highlight the need to combat inequalities as the main goal of their cooperation 
and development strategy 
The fight against global inequality is at the heart of the discourse and political agenda of UN member 
countries, but when we analyse G7 members’ strategic documents, we find that few countries have 
explicitly formalised the objective of reducing inequalities in their development policies. The United 
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States,5 the United Kingdom6 and Italy7, for instance, do not explicitly mention this objective in their 
strategies. Japan8 mentions it twice.  
However, the objective of inclusive growth that many donors mention in their strategic documents 
(U.S., U.K., Italy, France, Canada, etc.) can in itself be deemed an objective of within-country inequality 
reduction as far as the lowest part of the income distribution curve is concerned. The Italian strategy9 
refers, for instance, to the fight against inequalities as a positive side-effect of the channelling of 
private-sector investment towards sustainable development. Moreover, for Italy, the reduction of 
inequalities is the natural consequence of access to decent work. The United Kingdom10 uses the 
expression “promoting global prosperity” and sees behind this notion the need to promote “inclusive 
economic growth, jobs, investment and trade…that spreads benefits and opportunities right across 
society”. 
By the same logic, the objectives of contributing to access for all to essential services such as education, 
health and actions strengthening social goals, or at least not weakening them, are themselves 
objectives that academics refer to as being an ex-ante reduction of inequalities and which have an 
impact on reducing inequalities both between and within countries. Japan, for example, uses the term 
“rectifying disparities”.11 Underlying this concept is the need to invest in education, health and gender 
disparities. France encompasses inequality through the notion of “100% social link”,12 by emphasising 
support for gender-inclusive policies, and access for all essential services such as education and health. 
Thus, across G7 countries that identify the fight against inequality as a specific direct or indirect 
objective of development and cooperation policy, different interpretations of its meaning arise. 
Depending on the perspectives of the G7 members, definitions vary between fighting within-country 
inequalities and between-country inequalities.  
Germany,13 France14 and Canada15 explicitly emphasise the goal of reducing inequalities as a main 
objective of their development policy. Germany and France distinguish inequalities between 
countries and inequalities within country and consider both as critical for developing countries. Canada 
and Germany have this general objective of reducing inequalities running through all their strategies. 
Germany and Canada also share the specificity of linking inequality and fragility. Canada's vision, for 
example, is to “focus on empowering the poorest and most vulnerable to share in the benefits of 
growth. This helps to reduce poverty, inequality and marginalization” (Government of Canada, 2016). 
While not converging on the necessity to curb within-country or international inequality, donors 
nonetheless agree on the need to fight poverty. It should also be noted that some countries (Germany, 
for instance) link poverty reduction to peacebuilding: “without more investment in state building and 
peacebuilding the fragile states may well be home to almost two-thirds of people living in 
extreme poverty by 2030” (BMZ, 2017). 
                                                           
5 U.S. Agency for International Development (2019), USAID Policy Framework: Ending the Need for Foreign Assistance and U.S. Department 
of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (2018), Joint Strategic Plan FY 2018-2022, February 2018. 
6 U.K. Department for International Development (2017),Annual Report and Accounts 2017–18. 
7 Italy (2016), International Development Cooperation three-year programming and policy planning document 2017-2019. 
8 Japan MOFA (2017), Priority Policy for Development Cooperation FY2017. 
9 Italy (2016), international Development Cooperation three-year programming and policy planning document 2017-2019. 
10 U.K. Department for International Development (2017), Annual Report and Accounts 2017-18. 
11  Japan MOFA (2017), Priority Policy for Development Cooperation FY2017. 
12 Agence française de développement (2018) Pour un monde en commun Plan d’orientation stratégique 2018 – 2022, AFD, August 2018. 
13 BMZ (2017), Development Policy as Future-Oriented Peace-Policy – the German Government’s 15th Development Policy Report, June 
2017.  
14 Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères (2019), Projet de loi d’orientation et de programmation relative au développement 
durable solidaire et à la lutte contre les inégalités mondiales- Projet pour discussion au CNDSI le 22 Mars 2019. 
15 Global Affairs Canada (2016), Report to Parliament on the Government of Canada’s Official Development Assistance 2016-2017. 
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Finding 5: Most G7 members’ strategies focus on fragile state and not on vulnerabilities.  
It is interesting to note that the issue of fragile states tops most of G7 members’ development agenda 
(Japan, U.K., U.S., Canada, Germany and France) and that the term “fragile state” is preferred by G7 
members, rather than “vulnerability”. Several definitions and categories of fragile states coexist, most 
of them with their own conceptual underpinnings and practical limitations (Bøås, 2017; Eriksen, 2011; 
OECD, 2018).16 Vulnerability is defined here as the risk of being negatively affected by exogenous 
shocks. These shocks can be economic, environmental or socio-political in nature. The concept of 
fragility, used by G7 members, generally refers to fragility of States, so to this last dimension of 
vulnerability, even if there are many different definitions of fragility in the literature and between 
donors. In any case, G7 members’ strategies focus on a state’s fragility rather than vulnerability.  
Canada is an exception. It uses the word "vulnerable" not less than 99 times in its Global Affairs Canada, 
Report to Parliament on the Government of Canada’s Official Development Assistance 2016-2017. The 
focus is specifically on the “most vulnerable population”, meaning citizens within a country. Canada 
systematically links vulnerability and a state’s fragility. It does not adopt the definition of vulnerability 
spearheaded by the research community, which has tried to capture it through specific indices cutting 
across economic, socio-political and climatic dimensions (see Section 3).  
Finding 6: The fight against fragility encompasses different objectives among countries,  and also 
within governments.    
Due to the diversity of the root causes of fragilities and vulnerabilities, the spectrum of cooperation 
and development policy responses envisaged by G7 members to tackle these drivers is broad 
(Cammack et al., 2006). The need to build collaborative relationships among humanitarian aid, 
development assistance, and diplomacy in a large sense, including military actors, is now firmly 
recognised by and reflected in donor countries’ strategic thinking (OECD/DAC, 2007; JICA, 2008). 
However, efforts to link up the multiple dimensions of external action in fragile states tend to be 
hampered by the divergence or misalignment of donors’ objectives and priorities .    
All G7 governments regard fragile states as both a development and security challenge. However, they 
differ in the weight they give these two dimensions in their allocation of funding and in overall strategic 
planning. Motivations and objectives point in four directions:  i) national security, ii) development, 
iii) reducing refugee flows and iv) humanitarian aid. For example, Canada treats fragile states and 
global development as the centrepiece of its international engagement. Conversely, the United 
States is overwhelmingly motivated  by fighting terrorism, as is Japan, although to a 
lesser extent. France17 gives more weight to national security, whereas Germany and Italy focus on the 
causes of population displacements. The U.K. falls somewhere in the middle.    
Inevitably, each donor has its own priorities under the broad chapeau of “fighting fragilities and 
vulnerabilities”. What matters is to make the different objectives consistent with the overarching goal 
of securing a sustainable development pathway for the states and economies that are unequal as 
regards vulnerability. The Sahel Alliance is a good case in point: the initiative focuses on countries that 
are particularly vulnerable (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger), and presents interesting 
modalities for coordination among donors. According to the French Foreign Ministry,18 the Sahel 
                                                           
16 For an update in the definitions and indicators of fragile states, see in particular OECD (2018).  
17 Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères (2018), Prévention, résilience et paix durable, 2018-2022, Approche globale de réponse à 
la fragilisation des États et des sociétés, MEAE/DGM. 
18 Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères (2018), La force conjointe G5 Sahel et l’Alliance Sahel. 
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Alliance is not intended to be a new structure or financing entity, but a mechanism to reinforce 
coordination among partners in the five Sahel countries. The idea is to pool existing and planned funds 
and projects in order to make aid faster, more effective and better targeted.19 For the time being, the 
goal of the Sahel Alliance is to emulate effective coordination at project level, more than aligning the 
rationales of G7 members.20 
Strikingly enough, among governments, there is no such a systematic thing as a unified approach to 
fragile states. For most G7 members, the concept of “fragile state” seems most popular among 
development ministries, than among foreign or defence ministries. This lack of a unified strategic vision 
across government cabinets results in a welter of policy statements from different agencies. Only the 
U.S. among bilateral donors has formulated a government-wide fragile states strategy21  but this does 
not prevent the U.S. from having slightly different visions depending on which department took the 
lead in writing the strategic framework.22 
Finding 7:  G7 members focus on solving governance problems to address state fragility. 
When we look more specifically at the strategies of donors with respect to fragile states, almost all G7 
members emphasise good governance as the chief means of addressing fragility (Japan, Germany, 
France, the United States and Canada). France,23 for example, has focussed on peacebuilding, state-
building and democratic governance (page 16), within a comprehensive approach linking up 
humanitarian concerns, development, diplomacy and defence in a continuum (p. 23). The same holds 
for the U.S.,24 through the notion of “self-resilience”. U.S. aid aims to advance the United States’ 
fundamental values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. For Germany, stabilisation and peace 
are long-term objectives that also require partner countries’ ownership and good governance, with a 
focus on basic social services provision (p. 46)and human rights protection (P. 51). For Japan,25 counter-
terrorism, humanitarian assistance and improved governance work together towards  national 
interest. In the United Kingdom, the Department for International Development (DFID) first of all 
considers fragility as a threat to poverty reduction. The security threat comes second. Good 
governance also ranks among DFID’s top aid priorities.  For Canada, the development objective along 
with humanitarian assistance and social services provision is “democratic governance and institutions, 
the respect and promotion of diversity, inclusion, human rights and the rule of law”, particularly in 
fragile states. Canada describes these objectives as “hallmarks of the way of life in Canada”. So, too, 
are inclusive and accountable governance, and a dynamic and engaged civil society. 
Two countries highlight the need to promote inclusive growth in fragile states, namely the United 
States and Canada. In the Report to Parliament about Canada’s official development assistance often 
uses the term “growth that works for everybody”. Canada's vision is summarised in this sentence: 
“Sustainable and inclusive economic growth is fundamental for reducing poverty and achieving broad-
                                                           
19 Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères (2018), La force conjointe G5 Sahel et l’Alliance Sahel. 
20 Today, the Alliance has expanded to include twelve bilateral and multilateral partners: France, Germany, Denmark, the United Kingdom, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, the European Union, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. Sweden, Norway, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has observer status 
21 U.S. Department of States, U.S. Agency for International Development and U.S Department of Defense (2018), Framework for maximizing 
the effectiveness of US Government effort to stabilize conflict affected areas. 
22 Indeed, slightly different visions emerge in the three following U.S. documents : i) U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International 
Development and U.S Department of Defense (2018), Framework for maximizing the effectiveness of U .S. Government efforts to stabilize  
conflict affected areas, ii) U.S. Agency for International Development (2019), USAID policy Framework: Ending the Need for Foreign 
Assistance and iii) U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (2018), Joint Strategic Plan FY 2018-2022, February 
2018.  
23 Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères (2018), Prévention, résilience et paix durable, 2018-2022, Approche globale de réponse à 
la fragilisation des États et des sociétés, MEAE/DGM. 
24 U.S. Agency for International Development (2019), USAID Policy Framework: Ending the Need for Foreign Assistance. 
25 Japan MOFA (2017), Priority Policy for Development Cooperation FY2017. 
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based prosperity, peace and security. Canada focuses on empowering the poorest and most 
vulnerable—including women and youth—to share in the benefits of growth. This helps to reduce 
poverty, inequality and marginalization” (Government of Canada, p. 127). For the United States, 
“Strategic USAID assistance can support country partners more effectively in overcoming barriers to 
sustainable economic growth, inclusive development, democratic governance, and in building human 
and institutional capacity across sectors”(USAID, p. 8). 
Finally, only one country, Canada, explicitly highlights its role in helping fragile countries to adapt to 
climate change even though almost every country alludes to this challenge in parts of their strategy 
documents. Several times in its strategy, Canada raises the fact that support to climate change 
adaptation and mitigation improves the lives of vulnerable populations in developing countries. With 
its objectives of 100% compatibility with Paris Agreement, France (AFD) set up climate change 
adaptation and mitigation as a common concern cutting across its whole portfolio.  
  
3. An empirical analysis of vulnerability concerns across G7 ODA spending. 
 
By targeting economic, social and environmental vulnerabilities and governance weaknesses, 
cooperation policies can provide a relevant response to problems of inequality between countries. 
They can thereby also coordinate the means of addressing within-country inequality.   
The following statistical analysis aims to measure the importance that each donor, particularly those 
in the G7, attaches to the three dimensions of vulnerabilities in its allocation of development 
assistance.  
The purpose is twofold. It aims to reveal how donors geographically allocate aid (de facto or 
intentionally), and to compare the stylised facts then inferred with their discourses, described in the 
previous section.  
Model 
Following Amprou et al. (2007) and Guillaumont Jeanneney and Le Velly (2010), we consider the 
following model, which, for each donor, reveals the importance of a given criterion in its allocation of 
aid. The comparison of the score obtained by each donor for a specific criterion makes it possible to 
assess the relative preference of a donor for this criterion. 
W ij = A ij / A i  with A i the total gross ODA paid by donor i , A ij the gross ODA paid from 
donor i to recipient country j 26,27  
X * i = Σ W ij · X j with X j the level of the criterion X of the receiving country j , and X * i the score 
reflecting the selectivity of donor i’s assistance for criterion X. 
Criteria. On the basis of the above, we use as allocation criteria X those used by the United Nations to 
determine the least developed countries (LDCs), namely: gross national income per capita (GNIpc), 
economic vulnerability measured by the Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) and the level of human 
capital measured by the Human Capital Index (HAI). We also use an indicator of environmental 
                                                           
26 For bilateral donors, the analysis focuses only on their bilateral ODA, and only when the recipient country is identified. This effectively 
excludes “regional aid” and “geographically unspecified aid”. The results presented were calculated on the 2016 ODA . The results for the 
year 2017 are similar. 
27 Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 
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and climatic vulnerability, namely FERDI’s Physical Vulnerability to Climate Change Index (PVCCI),28  
and a measure of governance quality with the World Bank’s WGI.29 
Results by indicators 
Detailed results by bilateral (30 countries) and multilateral (34 institutions) donors are available in the 
appendix (for the year 2016). Our analysis focuses on the relative position of each donor with respect 
to each of the criteria. 
Among the G7 members, the aid allocations of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States 
appear to be the most sensitive to the three LDC criteria30, namely per capita income, economic 
vulnerability and the level of human capital, unlike France, Japan and Germany, whose relative position 
is in the second half of the ranking. Italy is in the middle range. Among the top-ranked donors on these 
criteria are the IMF and the African Development Fund. 
The G7 countries all appear to be relatively sensitive to vulnerability to climate change in their de facto 
allocation to countries. It is interesting to note that the institutions specialised in this area (mitigation 
as well as adaptation) are unevenly distributed in the ranking: the Climate Investment Fund is 3rd out 
of 64, the Global Green Growth Institute is 29th, and the Adaptation Fund is only 39th.  
Finally, the results for the quality of governance criterion are characterised by a dispersion of the G7 
countries in the ranking. France is the country whose allocation seems to be the most sensitive to this 
criterion ahead of Japan. Germany is in the middle of the ranking, while Italy and Canada, the United 
Kingdom and the United States are allocating their aid to countries with poorer governance. It is 
interesting to note that IDA (World Bank) is only 39th in this ranking despite an aid allocation formula 
in which the evaluation of national policies and institutions (CPIA) is critical. 
Interpretation.31 Reading these results, it appears that, on the traditional ODA allocation criteria (LDC 
criteria and governance), two groups of countries stand out. On the one hand, Germany, France and 
Japan, whose aid allocation seems to be less sensitive to the LDC criteria but more sensitive to 
governance, and on the other hand, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, which have 
somewhat opposite results. Italy has an average profile on LDC criteria and is less sensitive to 
governance issues. 
This dichotomy could be explained by the aid structure of these countries. Germany, France and Japan 
are the only G7 members with significant ODA in the form of loans (one-fifth for Germany, almost half 
for France and more than half for Japan). This form of development financing is generally less 
appropriate and less used in the poorest countries, which are often also those with the highest 
economic vulnerability and the lowest level of human capital. It is therefore not surprising to find 
donors with little or no lending among those whose allocation is sensitive to the criteria defining LDCs. 
The same reasoning may explain the ranking of G7 countries for the governance criterion, since the 
countries with lowest borrowing capacities are generally those with poorer governance quality. 
                                                           
28 Ferdi proposes an Index of Physical Vulnerability to Climate Change (PVCCI), measuring climatic shocks and countries’ exposure to these 
shocks. The PVCCI is independent from the current policy, making this index a potential criterion for the geographical allocation of 
international funds for climate change adaptation. For more details, please refers to: 
http://www.ferdi.fr/fr/indicateur/indicateur-de-vuln%C3%A9rabilit%C3%A9-physique-au-changement-climatique  
29 We used the average of the 6 components of the WGI database, namely “Voice and Accountability”, “Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence”, “Government Effectiveness”, “Regulatory Quality”, “Rule of Law” and “Control of Corruption”: 
https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home   
30 Considered separately 
31 These results should also be interpreted according to the volume of ODA of each donor and also according to all the criteria.  
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However, applied on grants only, the model provides fairly close results, except for Japan whose 
sensitivity to EVI is significantly higher32. A more in-depth study of each country's actual allocations 
would be necessary to take the analysis further33. 
By contrast, this group distinction does not apply to the criterion of vulnerability to climate change. The 
latter is not yet a major criterion for the allocation of international aid. 
Inequalities. According to the above-mentioned linkage between vulnerabilities / governance and 
inequalities, each donor’s involvement in addressing inequalities between countries and within 
countries can be seen in the geographical priorities shown for their assistance described above. 
Because the interpretation is ambiguous and within-country inequalities cannot be a criterion of aid 
allocation, we simply mention here the result of applying the selectivity model to the Gini variable to 
reveal which donor, through its geographical allocation, targets countries with significant internal 
inequalities. It appears that Italy and France allocate relatively more aid to countries with high internal 
inequalities than other G7 members. Japan and Germany, however, appear to be less sensitive to this 
issue. 
Sahelian priority. The second session of this paper mentions the Sahel Alliance as an interesting case 
in point for donor coordination, in this region of Africa that faces the most challenges regarding its 
vulnerability. Table 2 in the appendix ranks donors according to the share of G5 Sahel countries in their 
geographical ODA over the period 2015–2017. Three G7 countries stand out with a relatively higher 
percentage than the others: Canada (7.5%), France (6.2%) and Italy (5.6%). It should be noted that the 
United Kingdom's aid to the G5 Sahel countries is almost nil over this period, but the United Kingdom's 
accession to the Sahel Alliance in 2018 should lead to an increase in British aid to this region. 
Furthermore, based on the country vulnerability indicators used in this paper, G5 Sahel countries are 
facing high economic, social and environmental vulnerabilities. They are in the second part of the 
ranking of developing countries for governance quality, and have a very low level of human capital. 
The Guillaumont, Jeanneney et al. report (2016) shows how these multiple vulnerabilities constitute a 
fertile breeding ground for insecurity in the Sahel and thus a major threat to the development of 
countries in the sub-region. Promoting equality of opportunity in Sahelian countries and populations 
requires significant support from donors to better address their vulnerabilities.  
                                                           
32 Results not presented in annex but available from the authors. 
33 To this end, it could be notably interesting to use available geocoded and subnational data to measure subnational allocation of aid to 
better understand why aid may not flow to poorer areas in partner countries. See for instance Hannes et al (2017). 
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